Trial Court Briefs

Full Text of Motion

STATE COURT of RICHMOND COUNTY

STATE of GEORGIA

Clinton Crawford, on his own behalf, as wrongful death plaintiff, and as Executor of the Estate of Dorothy Crawford,

Plaintiff

— versus —

Piedmont Healthcare, Inc.

University Health Services, Inc., doing business as Piedmont Augusta Hospital

John/Jane Doe 1-10,

Defendants

Civil Action

File No. 2024 RCSC 00591

Hon. Robert W. Hunter, III

Jury Trial Demanded

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Responsive Answers to Interrogatories 46 & 47

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 3

BACKGROUND 4

THE INTERROGATORIES 5

MEET-&-CONFER CERTIFICATION 6

ARGUMENT 9

1. Proper answers to the interrogatories are relevant, so PHI must give legally sufficient answers. 9

2. PHI’s response is impermissibly evasive because it neither provides a substantive response nor says the information is unavailable. 10

3. PHI’s objections are invalid and do not excuse their evasive answers. 13

WHY THIS MATTERS 15

WHAT THE DEFENSE SAYS 16

CONCLUSION 17

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff’s counsel should not have to file this motion, and the Court should not have to address it. Plaintiff served two interrogatories going to core issues in the case. This case involves a hospital patient who suffocated because her windpipe was blocked and effective help did not arrive soon enough. The patient suffered catastrophic brain injury and died weeks later. The hospital had offered a surgery — an elective thyroidectomy, a type of neck surgery — without making sure the hospital could keep patients alive if they suffered post-operative bleeding in the neck.

The central question in the case is the extent to which Piedmont Healthcare, Inc. (PHI) and University Health Services, Inc. (UHS) (the companies that ran the hospital) created a well-functioning system that promoted a culture of safety — or instead, a dysfunctional system that promoted a culture of neglect. Other questions include when help was summoned after Dorothy Crawford was found with difficulty breathing.

Plaintiff served two interrogatories — one asking when the responding surgeon was called, and one asking when the “Rapid Response” and “Code Blue” alerts were called. Plaintiff served these two interrogatories on PHI. PHI owns and manages UHS, which directly runs the hospital.

The statute on interrogatories, OCGA 9-11-33, says the responding party “shall furnish such information as is available to the party.” We have textualist appellate courts: They take the words of statutes seriously. As many courts have noted, the phrase “available to” in the statute means that “a responding party must respond to interrogatories fully and completely … including … any information obtainable by him through reasonable inquiry.” Weber v. OPMS, 2024 Ga. State LEXIS 1735 (Fulton County State Court, Mather, J.).

Nonetheless, PHI responded to both interrogatories by saying “This Defendant states it does not maintain information responsive to this request….” That response is evasive. “Available to” is broader than “maintained by.” Information may be available to PHI even if PHI does not maintain it.

Since PHI owns and manages UHS, it seems likely that PHI can provide a substantive response to the interrogatories with reasonable effort. But even if PHI cannot, the law requires PHI to make clear that the requested information is not available to it. In this case, even that — the unavailability of the information to PHI — would be important. If the owner and manager of UHS cannot get this basic information from UHS, that would demonstrate a dysfunctional system with poor communication and (likely) poor morale — the sort of system that leads to a culture of neglect in which a hospital offer an elective surgery without making sure the hospital can keep patients alive after the surgery if they suffer a known, potentially fatal post-op complication.

Despite extended meet-and-confer efforts, PHI refuses to provide either substantive answers to these interrogatories or to say the information is not available to PHI. This motion asks the Court to order the Defense either to provide substantive answers to these two interrogatories or to declare that the information is not available to them.

BACKGROUND & ISSUES IN THE CASE

This case arises out of negligent administration of Piedmont Augusta Hospital. The concept of a “culture of safety” is foundational to healthcare administration. To an outsider, “culture of safety” may sound soft and woozy — hippie-ish, almost. But the healthcare industry has adopted it as a core aspect of patient safety. The Joint Commission (TJC) is the main accreditation body for hospitals. In their Comprehensive Accreditation Manual, TJC includes the creation and maintenance of a “safety culture” as part of the standards for hospital leadership. Similarly, TJC issues a publication series titled “Sentinel Event Alerts.” In 2017, TJC issued an Alert titled “The essential role of leadership in developing a safety culture.” (They updated the Alert in 2021.) TJC writes, “The Joint Commission’s Sentinel Event Database reveals that leadership’s failure to create an effective safety culture is a contributing factor to many types of adverse events – from wrong site surgery to delays in treatment.”

As part of a culture of safety, a hospital’s administration must put processes in place to make sure that if the hospital offers a type of surgery, the staff are trained, instructed, and equipped to properly handle the known post-operative complications that can kill the patient in minutes.

Piedmont did not do this: They created not a culture of safety, but a culture of neglect. And they did not put processes in place to make sure they could keep neck surgery patients alive if the patient had post-operative bleeding in the neck. Because of that, Dorothy Crawford suffocated, suffered catastrophic brain injury, and died after lingering in the hospital for weeks.

A post-operative hematoma in the neck is a well-recognized complication of a thyroidectomy — a form of neck surgery. A post-operative hematoma can compress the windpipe and suffocate the patient. In some cases, that can happen in minutes. In any case, once the patient is struggling to breathe, the patient may have only minutes before catastrophic harm. Once the patient is having severe difficulty breathing, the superficial sutures must be cut — the sutures on the skin of the neck at the incision site. That’s enough to save the patient’s life. Cutting just those sutures will give the accumulating blood has an escape route and relieve pressure on the windpipe so the patient can breathe.

Dorothy Crawford underwent a thyroidectomy at Piedmont Augusta Hospital. Hours after the surgery, Dorothy’s daughter and husband were in the room when Dorothy began showing signs of difficulty breathing. Her daughter ran to get help. Nurses came to the room. There was some period during which the nurses did not seem to know what to do. At some point they called a “Rapid Response” (which summons other nurses but does not summon any physician). Then later, at some point, someone called a Code Blue. And at some point someone called the surgeon.

The first physician to arrive was not a member of the Code Blue Team, but rather the surgeon who had performed the thyroidectomy. When the surgeon arrived, Dorothy was already suffocating and in cardiac arrest. Her heart had stopped beating. The surgeon cut the sutures on Dorothy’s neck and began evacuating the hematoma. It was too late. Dorothy was already profoundly brain injured. She languished in the hospital for about three months before dying.

THE INTERROGATORIES

Plaintiff served two interrogatories on PHI, the parent company that owns and manages UHS. The interrogatories seek information about when and how the calls for help went out:

46. Call to Dr. Yeh [for PHI only]

Please describe the circumstances of Dr. Yeh’s being notified to come to Dorothy Crawford’s hospital room on 5/10/2022 shortly before the Code Blue. Please explain as fully as you can (e.g., who made the call, from where, at what time, what they said, etc.).

47. Alert Timing [for PHI only]

Please state the times at which the Rapid Response alert and the Code Blue alerts on May 10, 2022, for Dorothy Crawford were made.

(Ex 1.)

PHI responded to both interrogatories by saying, “this Defendant states it does not maintain information responsive to this request and states that Piedmont Augusta Hospital may have responsive information.” (Ex 1.)

MEET-&-CONFER CERTIFICATION

The parties met and conferred by telephone as well as email. Shortly after the Defense served the responses, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed them to note that the responses do not say the information is unavailable to PHI:

Sarah, the rogs statute requires the responding party to “furnish such information as is available to the party.” These responses have PHI, the parent company of the hospital company, saying that PHI “does not maintain” the requested information.

The “does not maintain” response is ambiguous. Please supplement the response either to confirm that this info from the hospital company is not “available” to the parent company or to provide the information.

(Ex. 2, pg. 2.) Defense counsel responded only by saying: “We will stand on the responses, Dan.” (Id., pg. 5.) Plaintiff’s counsel proposed an alternative solution:

Do you confirm that we can interpret the responses as meaning that the parent company, PHI, does not have access to the requested info that the hospital has? If you can confirm that on your client’s behalf, then a supplement is not necessary.

(Id., pg. 6.) Again Defense counsel purported not to understand: “We will stand by our responses, Dan. I don’t know what else to tell you.” (Id., pg. 7.) Plaintiff’s counsel asked for a meet-and-confer phone call. (Id., pg. 8.) No response. Next day, Plaintiff’s counsel asked again, and provided some caselaw in advance of a call. (Id., pg. 9-10.) Defense counsel did not respond except to say, “Dan, take a breath. We will work this out.” (Id., pg. 12.)

In phone calls and later emails, the Defense continued to refuse either a substantive answer by PHI or a statement that the information is not available to them. Defense counsel did tell Plaintiff’s counsel that the substantive information no longer exists, because records have been destroyed. And Defense counsel said UHS would admit as much in an interrogatory response. (Id., pg. 16.) That did not solve the problem. As Plaintiff’s counsel explained:

I understand all that, but it doesn’t address the point I’m getting at. I just need the parent company to say explicitly that the information is not available to them. That’s it. I know the parent has said they don’t maintain the information, but that’s different. And the difference is not trivial in this case. I’ve explained why the difference matters here.

(Id., pg. 17.) The reason the difference matters here is that if PHI — the owner and manager of UHS — cannot access the requested information, that is evidence of the sort of organizational dysfunction that leads to a culture of neglect in which a hospital offers an elective surgery without making sure the hospital is equipped to handle the known post-op complications that can kill a patient in minutes.

Plaintiff again proposed a way out of the dispute: “It would be enough for my purposes if PHI will stipulate that at trial they will not testify or argue that they did have access to the information. … If PHI will stipulate to that, we can avoid the hassle of a motion. Will they?” (Id., pg. 18.) The Defense did not respond.

Finally, on June 16, four business days before filing this motion, we sent a draft of it to the Defense, in hope that it would prompt them to supplement their interrogatory responses and avoid the need to file this motion. (Ex. 2, pg. 19.) It did not. The Defense responded not by offering the proposed stipulation, a supplemental response, or legal authority. Instead, the Defense suggested they haven’t had enough time. This issue arose on May 1 — two months and three weeks ago. The Defense also suggested this issue isn’t important enough to justify a motion. (Ex. 2, pg. 22.) And the Defense asserted that Plaintiff has misstated the facts. The Defense cited no examples of misstatements, nor any contrary evidence. Instead the Defense advised, “Get some sleep, Dan.” (Ex. 2, pg. 24.)

ARGUMENT

1. Proper answers to the interrogatories are relevant, so PHI must give legally sufficient answers.

The two interrogatories at issue here seek relevant information — the timing of calls for help when Dorothy Crawford had difficulty breathing, and whether PHI, the parent company that manages the hospital company, has access to that information. Georgia law requires PHI either to give a substantive answer to these interrogatories or to say (if true) that the information is not available to them. PHI has done neither of those things.

The Civil Practice Act provides that “Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired into under subsection (b) of Code Section 9-11-26.” OCGA 9-11-33(b). And pursuant to § 26(b), “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action…. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

Evidence need not be admissible to be discoverable. OCGA 9-11-26(b)(1). But evidence that PHI and UHS are dysfunctional to the point that PHI cannot get basic information from UHS would be admissible. The Evidence Code provides that “other acts” apart from those directly at issue are relevant to show “absence of mistake or accident.” OCGA 24-4-404(b). Additionally, the Code provides that “Evidence … of the routine practice of an organization, … is relevant to prove that the conduct … on a particular occasion was in conformity with such habit or routine practice.” OCGA 24-4-406. A jury could reasonably infer that if PHI is unable to get basic information from UHS today, then that reflects routine, habitual negligent administration. (Note: Obviously, the inadmissibility of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence has no application here. We’re not talking about subsequent remedial action. We’re talking about subsequent negligence.) Whatever PHI’s proper response to these two interrogatories would be — either a substantive answer or an admission that the information is not available to them — the answers are relevant.

Since the interrogatories seek relevant information, the CPA requires PHI to answer them.

2. PHI’s response is impermissibly evasive because it neither provides a substantive response nor says the information is unavailable.

PHI’s answers to the interrogatories are impermissibly evasive. The law requires PHI to “furnish such information as is available to the party.” OCGA 9-11-33(a). PHI’s answers say only that PHI “does not maintain” the information. (Ex. 1.) But that doesn’t mean the information is unavailable. “We don’t maintain it” and “we can’t get it” are two different things. They might both be true, but they don’t have to be. The first statement does not imply the second. The statute on interrogatories requires the responding party to furnish whatever information they can get with reasonable effort, regardless of whether the party maintains the information. That is clear from the plain meaning of the statute, but if confirmation from caselaw were needed, there’s plenty of it. E.g.:

• Weber v. OPMS, 2024 Ga. State LEXIS 1735 (Fulton County State Court, Mather, J.) (“[A] responding party must respond to interrogatories fully and completely, supply all information within his knowledge, possession or control, including information available through his attorney, investigators, or representative, and any information obtainable by him through reasonable inquiry.”)

• City of Las Cruces v. US, 2021 US Dist LEXIS 18467 (DNM Feb. 1, 2021) (“Rule 33(b) requires that an officer or agent responding to an interrogatory on behalf of an incorporated party answer based on ‘the information available to the party.’ This information is not limited to that which is maintained in the ordinary course of business or otherwise known and immediately available. Rather, it extends to information that a party may obtain with reasonable effort, including that held by assignors, agents, representatives, current employees, and former employees, even if they are not personally known to the party.”)

• Goodrich v. Emhart, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 17190 (CD Cal. June 10, 2005) (“A corporation responding to interrogatories must provide not only the information contained in its own files and possessed by its own employees, but also all information under its control. Accordingly, when the parent is served with an interrogatory, it is no defense to claim that the information is within the possession of a wholly owned subsidiary, because such a corporation is owned and controlled by such interrogee. The discovery rules require that a corporation furnish such information as is available from the corporation itself or from sources under its control. If the corporation can obtain the information from sources under its control, it may not avoid answering by alleging ignorance.”)

• United States v. Kramer, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 7651 (DNJ Mar. 31, 1992) (“A party is required to use reasonable efforts to gather responsive information. Depending upon circumstances, a corporate party has the duty to furnish such information as is known by its subsidiaries or predecessors, and by its employees, and by a related company having documents which are readily available to the party, so as to be in its constructive control.”)

• Sol S. Turnoff v. NV Nederlandsche, 55 FRD 347 (ED Pa 1972) (“interrogatories addressed to a corporate party may properly seek information which is in the possession of subsidiaries or predecessors in name of that party. If subsidiaries or controlled corporations possess the desired information and defendants’ control over them is such that the information is ‘available’ to defendants, defendants may not refuse to answer because the source of the information is a separate corporate entity. If the information sought is not ‘available’ to defendants, they may so state.”).

PHI has neither given a substantive answer nor said the information is unavailable to them. They say only that they do not “maintain” the information. That’s not an answer. That’s an evasion.

The evasion seems intentional. When Plaintiff’s counsel pointed out the problem to the Defense, they purported not to understand the difference between information that is available to PHI and information that PHI maintains. That purported lack of understanding is not credible — not from English speakers who’ve gone to college and law school and passed the bar exam. Further, even after Plaintiff’s counsel sent caselaw to the Defense (including a draft of this brief), the Defense kept up the pretense. Most tellingly, the Defense still dug in their heels even after Plaintiff offered to accept a stipulation that PHI will not claim at trial that the information was available to them. That is, PHI is at least keeping open the option of having it both ways — withholding a substantive answer but also claiming later that they could have given a substantive answer if they’d wanted to.

Under Georgia law, “an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.” OCGA 9-11-37(a)(3). Under Georgia law, PHI’s evasion counts as no answer at all.

3. PHI’s objections are invalid and do not excuse their evasive answers.

PHI abandoned their objections during the meet-and-confer process, but the objections were invalid in any event. PHI wrote:

This Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the grounds it is overbroad and exceeds the scope of the Georgia Civil Practice Act. Additionally, this interrogatory is more appropriate for a deposition.

(Ex. 1.) Neither interrogatory is overbroad or beyond the scope of discovery. Both interrogatories seek relevant facts. The Defense does not explain how either interrogatory is overbroad or beyond the scope of discovery, because they are not. The interrogatories are proper.

The Defense’s statement that the issues are “more appropriate for a deposition” is irrelevant. It is not a cognizable objection. First, even if that were a potentially valid objection (which it is not) it could not apply here. The Defense has already said informally that the information sought by the interrogatories has been deleted. (Ex. 2, pg. 16.) That’s more easily said in an interrogatory response than in a deposition (with the attendant scheduling hassle, gathering of witness(es), lawyers, and court reporter, and costs).

Second, more importantly, a responding party’s preference for one type of discovery device is not a lawful basis for refusing to respond to a different type of discovery request. The Civil Practice Act says “Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired into under subsection (b) of Code Section 9-11-26.” OCGA 9-11-33(b). The CPA further says “Parties may obtain discovery by one or more” of the methods of discovery and “Unless the court orders otherwise under subsection (c) of this Code section, the frequency of use of these methods is not limited.” OCGA 9-11-26(a). As for subsection (c) of § 26, it provides for limitations on discovery “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”

Nothing in the Civil Practice Act allows one party to dictate another party’s discovery strategy. Nothing in the Civil Practice Act allows a party to refuse to respond to one type of discovery request on the ground that the same issue could be addressed through a different type of discovery request.

The sole statutory basis for limiting discovery is “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” A preference to answer questions orally in a deposition, rather than in writing, at leisure, does not constitute “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” The Defense does not say otherwise. The Civil Practice Act does not recognize “more appropriate for a deposition” as a basis for refusing to answer an interrogatory. Cf.:

• Dutchuk v. Yesner, 2021 US Dist LEXIS 166601 (D Alaska Sep. 2, 2021) (“Neither plaintiff ever further explains the bases for any of these objections to this interrogatory, but they instead argue that this narrative is better suited for deposition testimony. However, this argument has no support in the law as the discovery rules clearly permit parties to conduct discovery via both interrogatories and depositions.”)

• Gevas v. Baldwin, 2020 US Dist LEXIS 215777 (ND Ill Nov. 18, 2020) (“Defendant also contends that Plaintiff’s question is more appropriate for a deposition because it calls for a narrative response. An interrogatory is not objectionable simply because the answer will be in narrative form. … Neither is a party prevented from obtaining an interrogatory response just because the information may be discovered through an alternate discovery device. It is long standing and well-settled that methods of discovery are complementary, rather than alternative or exclusive.”)

• Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 FRD 466 (ND Tex 2014) (“Absent a court order providing otherwise or a binding stipulation, Rule 26(d)(2)(A) generally dictates that Plaintiffs may seek information through an interrogatory even if Defendant believes the subject matter would be better explored through a deposition.”)

• Audiotext v. US Telecom, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 15416 (D Kan Oct. 5, 1995) (“Plaintiffs, however, suggest that depositions or interrogatories may more appropriately provide the same information. Conceding the point resolves nothing. Parties may choose the manner and method in which they conduct discovery. The Federal Rules provide several vehicles for discovery. Parties may choose their preferred methodology. Courts generally will not interfere in such choices. Plaintiffs have shown no abuse of discovery to warrant such judicial interference.”).

PHI’s objections to these two interrogatories do not excuse their evasions. The interrogatories are relevant, and it is irrelevant that the same issue can be explored through multiple modes of discovery.

WHY THIS MATTERS

At one level, it should be justification enough for this motion that the Defense looks at the law, shrugs, and refuses to follow it. We’re lawyers. We’re supposed to obey the law. It’s a problem that the Defense — both their outside counsel and in-house counsel — refuse. Beyond that, though, this motion is important for two reasons:

First, if it is true that PHI — the company that owns and manages UHS — cannot readily get a substantive answer to these interrogatories, then PHI’s inability is relevant to the negligent-administration claim. That inability is evidence of a dysfunctional organization with poor communication and poor morale — the sort of dysfunction that creates a culture of neglect and leads the hospital to offer surgeries without making sure they can properly address the post-op complications that can kill patients in minutes. That tends to prove that the problem here was one of negligent administration, not just one-off failures by individual doctors and nurses.

Second, as they stand, PHI’s responses allow PHI to have it both ways. They withhold a substantive answer, but they allow themselves to insist at trial that they’re not as dysfunctional as they look — that they could have answered these interrogatories if they’d wanted to. At trial, it will be difficult to impeach that claim. Enforcing the legal requirement to give a proper answer will prevent this have-it-both-ways tactic.

WHAT THE DEFENSE SAYS

In meeting and conferring, the Defense has not cited any legal authorities to support PHI’s position. Instead, the Defense has made the following points. We respond briefly to each.

1. You can send interrogatories to UHS, so who cares about PHI’s response? We have repeatedly explained why it is relevant whether the Piedmont organization is so dysfunctional that PHI cannot get the information to give a substantive response.

2. The Defense lawyers have given you information informally, so what more could you want? We want admissible evidence, and we want to know if PHI can or cannot get the information to give substantive responses.

3. The records showing the timing of the rapid response, code blue, and call to Dr. Yeh have been deleted, so why bother pressing for the information? We need the claim of deleted records in admissible form, not in an inadmissible email from a lawyer. And, again, we need to know whether PHI has access to the information that those records have (purportedly) been deleted.

4. Are you really going to bother the Court with this? Yes. Again, it is highly relevant if Piedmont is so dysfunctional, has such broken communication systems, that PHI cannot get basic information from UHS. The question to the Defense is: Are you really going to disobey a clear (and easy) legal requirement unless Plaintiff files a motion?

CONCLUSION

This motion should not have been necessary. Neither Plaintiff’s counsel nor the Court should have to explain the meaning of words like “available to” and “maintain.” Throughout the meet-and-confer process — even after receiving a draft of this motion four business days before it was filed — the Defense never offered any substantive justification for their position. They just pretended not to know what “available to” means.

Plaintiff asks the Court to order Piedmont Healthcare, Inc. to answer Plaintiff’s interrogatories 46 and 47, either providing a substantive response or stating that the information is not available to them.

July 22, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Daniel E. Holloway

Georgia Bar No. 658026

DEH Law

2062 Promise Road, Unit 1305

Rapid City, SD 57701

404-670-6227

dan@dehlegal.com

Jacob Jackson

Georgia Bar No. 290880

Jackson Injury Firm

10 Glenlake Parkway Suite 130

Atlanta, GA 30328

404-777‑6387

jacob@jacksoninjuryfirm.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned has served the foregoing document on all counsel of record, by filing the document with the Court’s efiling system.

July 22, 2025

/s/ Daniel E. Holloway

Georgia Bar No. 658026